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Institutional concentration and domestic firm investment decisions in Belarus 
 
ABSTRACT 
The chapter analyses changes in the level of decision-making autonomy of state-
controlled and private companies operating in Belarus under the conditions of increasing 
institutional concentration. We find that the excessive regulatory burden still allows for 
some enterprise-level autonomy in investment decisions, particularly for private 
companies, while state-controlled companies have to resort to using their informal 
connections to secure the ability to operate semi-autonomously. The findings thus 
challenge the thesis on extreme rigidity of Belarusian regulatory system and shed light on 
certain management practices at the company level.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Applying Zartman and Rubin (2000) theory of power and negotiation, the chapter 
analyses investment decisions made by private and quasi-private Belarusian firms under 
continuously increasing institutional concentration. For the first two decades of transition, 
institutional fluidity, dominance of informal business interest groups, business networks 
and ethnic clans over weakened government structures were common in former Soviet 
economies (e.g., Wedel, 2001; Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2006; Melnykovska, 2008; 
Closson, 2009; Ledeneva, 2009). The raison d'etre behind the domestic firms' investment 
decisions at the time was often determined by the desire to secure firms' financial future 
by complying with unwritten ‘rules of the game’.  
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The decline of the legitimacy of formal institutions and prevailing informality in 
state-firm relations in the region has its roots in blat – informal corruption networks of 
the Soviet society which provided enterprise directors with access to limited economic 
resources, the task only possible through well-established political connections.  
The adoption of a number of new laws during perestroika1 did not remove the 
power of the blat but, rather, gave the informality a new dimension. With a de-facto 
denationalisation and privatisation of the Soviet economy, informal business/ethnic 
interest groups managed to obtain the access to the resources previously controlled by the 
state. By 1991, politically connected individuals and the insiders from the Communist 
political elite assumed ownership of at least two-thirds of Russian industrial enterprises 
(e.g., McFaul, 1995) forming oligarchic groupings with incredible lobbying power. 
Formal state institutions had to either give in to the power of informal networks (e.g., 
Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2006; Viktorov, 2015) or merge with them, creating 
authoritarian neopatrimonial regimes (e.g., Ilkhamov, 2007; Özcan, 2010; Laruelle, 2012; 
Lewis, 2012).  
However, the last two decades have seen the state largely restoring the position it 
had lost in the 1980s-1990s. The most notable example here is Russia where the 
government managed to subdue oligarchic lobbying groups to formal ‘rules of the game’. 
The new model is believed to be characterised by considerable state involvement in the 
economy, clientelism and  corruption, and has hence been labeled  patrimonial state 
capitalism (e.g.,Easter, 2008; Robinson, 2011, Becker, 2013). At the same time, informal 
                                                          
1 The situation started to change in 1987 when the law ‘On the state enterprise’ granted the working 
collective the ability to fully dispose of the profit while the assets still remained in the state property. It was 
followed by the introduction of five major laws: ‘On cooperation in the USSR’ (1988), ‘The foundations 
of the rent in the USSR’ (1989) ‘On the property in the RSFSR’ (1990), ‘On the general foundations of 
entrepreneurship for the citizens in the USSR’ (1991) and ‘On the privatisation of the state and municipal 
enterprises in RSFSR’ (1991).  
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practices remain embedded in routine business practices of small and medium Russian 
companies (Vasileva, 2017) thus indicating a similarity between the current Russian 
political-economic model and its Soviet predecessor in terms of the power of informality 
in state-business relations.   
This chapter focuses on Belarus which is another example of continuity between the 
Soviet and the modern model of state-business relations. Unlike most of its post-Soviet 
neighbours, Belarus has never experienced institutional fluidity after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The government’s attempt to maintain a Soviet regulatory model through 
the multitude of presidential decrees and government enactments has led to ever 
increasing state involvement in the economy (Danilovich and Croucher, 2015, Adarov et 
al., 2016). It has been previously argued that imbalanced institutional and political 
environment in Belarus, characterised by extreme concentration of government 
institutions and fluidity of non-governmental structures, as well as indirect state 
ownership of a large proportion of industrial and service companies, negatively affect the 
ability of the senior management of domestic firms to make economically rational 
investment decisions causing further institutional concentration. Despite the efforts of 
external lending organisations to encourage the development of state-independent private 
sector, the industry has largely remained in the state’s hands thus preserving the 
dominance of industrial ministries or kontsern’ over the management’s decision-making 
in state-owned and quasi-privatised companies.  
However, unlike Russia, the degree of informality in day-to-day business activities seems  
to have fallen. We have a reason to believe that the state’s  desire to reduce the role of 
informality for individual businesses has partially led to westernisation of business 
practices in industries dominated by private companies, particularly the IT industry.  For 
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others, however, informal relations with government institutions have remained a 
significant part of operations. One may argue, however, that even under these conditions, 
senior management of Belarusian companies manages to preserve a certain degree of 
independence in decision making and are able to yield profits. Thus one may question the 
actual degree of dicfunctionality of the Belarusian regulatory model.  
In this chapter we are trying to assess the degree of independent decision-making by 
Belarusian enterprise directors with regards to investment under the conditions of 
increasing concentration of formal institutions. From a managerial perspective we 
contribute to the understanding of peculiarities of intra-firm decision-making under the 
conditions of the ‘fake’ transition. 
From the policy perspective we highlight important institutional differences 
between Belarus and other economies of transitional periphery, most of which are 
characterised by considerable institutional fluidity and dominance of clan politics. We 
assess the extent to which the capacity of businesses to act independently is being 
suppressed by the single powerful actor forcing these organisations to find ways around 
formal ‘rules of the game’. We then discuss whether the state-business relations are one 
of the factors contributing to the ability of Belarusian economy to still stay afloat despite 
massive external debt and outdated industrial base.  We therefore contribute to the debate 
on the nature of the institutional and socio-economic transformation at post-Soviet 
transitional periphery and its potential implications for domestic firms. 
We start by deriving our research questions from the critical analysis of existing 
literature on post-Soviet transition trajectories, with the special focus on Belarus. We then 
explain our research methodology. The chapter continues by analysing primary and 
secondary data on enterprise decision-making, informality and institutional development 
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in Belarus. We conclude with deriving main patterns of state-business relations in Belarus 
and assessing the effect they have on the development of the country’s socio-economic 
model.  
 
 
 
 
THEORY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The effect of national economic elites on the direction of transition trajectories in 
former Soviet economies has been long recognised (e.g., Wedel, 2001; Frye, 2002, 2010; 
Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2003; Iwasaki and Suziki, 2007; Junisbai, 2010). Three 
main models of state-business relations in the post-Soviet space have been identified: the 
oligarchic state-capture, the ethnic-clan neopatrimonialism and the indirect negotiated 
influence with the authoritarian state.  
Oligarchic state-capture was common in Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and some 
of the economies of the Caucasus where collaborating oligarchic business structures had 
a strong influence on the formation of the new economic and political environment by 
merging with weakened formal institutions and using the newly created ties to divert 
considerable economic resources towards themselves (Olson, 2000; Fries, Lysenko and 
Polanec, 2003; Guriev and Rachinsky, 2006; Closson, 2009; Pyle, 2011) forcing the 
governments to resort to coercive methods of corporate exploitation (licencing, 
inspections, etc.) in order to keep at least some control over the economy (Johnson, 
McMill and Woodruff, 2002; Iwasaki and Suzuki, 2007). 
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At the start of the transition, the process of oligarchic state capture was dominated 
by criminal organisations and oligarchs who grew out of the old Soviet elite (Aslund, 
Boone and Johnson, 2001).  After 2005 these groups gradually lost their influence and 
were replaced with merged power networks between new business elites and top 
government bureaucrats (e.g, Frye, 2002; Viktorov, 2015). While business elites in 
Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasian economies continued to dominate in economics and 
politics (Closson, 2009; Fisun, 2016; Markus and Charnysh, 2017), in Russia the state 
managed to reclaim a large share of its bargaining power by suppressing its business allies 
through a series of repressive measures (e.g., Hoffman, 2011). This led to the formation 
of a new type of negotiation-based state-business relations with both parties being of 
relatively equal perceived bargaining power and being forced to assume common 
motivational orientation in order to function efficiently. 
At the same time, non-oligarchic business entities in Russia remain a weak party 
in negotiations with the state bodies and are therefore forced to resort to corruption in 
dealing with the state machine. Recent research into entrepreneurial orientation and 
investment decisions of Russian SMEs found that operating in unstable institutional 
environment characterised by a large ‘shadow economy’ compels many companies to 
make decisions based on the information obtained from informal, sometimes, illegal 
contacts they develop with the local officials in order to circumvent the limitations 
imposed by formal rules and regulations (Wales et al., 2016). Unfortunately, large 
inconsistencies in informal relations combined with instability in the protection of private 
property rights leave many Russian companies exposed to private raiding, creating 
fundamental threats to their existence (Levina et al., 2016).  
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Ethnic-clan neopatrimonialism is a characteristic feature of socio-political 
transition in Central Asian economies, where certain nationalities/ethnic clans managed 
to preserve and further accumulate wealth and political influence within a certain territory 
due to lack of push ‘from below’. The absence of ‘critical junctures’ together with the 
Soviet legacy have led to the establishment of rent-seeking, authoritarian regimes across 
Central Asia. The emergence of the entrepreneurial class in these countries occurred 
under the direct political patronage, forcing the business to negotiate its position with the 
ruling political elite in order to secure property rights which resulted in high levels of 
government corruption (e.g., Özkan, 2010; Pomfret, 2012; Kubicek, 2016).  
Similarly to Russia and Ukraine, SMEs in Central Asia and Caucasus suffer from 
widespread corruption and base their investment decisions on insider information from 
informal sources. Corruption and strong ties between the business elite and the 
officialdom resulted in the emergence ‘frozen state’, with no visible institutional or socio-
economic dynamics (Gallina, 2010). Özkan (2010) study of entrepreneurs in Uzbekistan 
demonstrated low appreciation of the business society of the quality of the country’s legal 
system and the judiciary;  the majority of entrepreneurs would prefer to seek solution by 
using family and friends network rather than go through official channels. Informal ties 
seem to be working the best if both parties are of the same ethnic origin/clan. A more 
recent inquiry into SME financing in Uzbekistan further confirmed the importance of 
informal connections to government bureaucracy for entrepreneurs when securing formal 
financing  (Ruziev and Midmore, 2015). Thus one can argue that although on the surface 
the two models that emerged across the post-Soviet region are quite different in that they 
give the upper hand to opposite parties (the state in Russia and ethnic clans in Central 
Asia), they are similar in nature since effective business operations within both models 
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require the companies to maintain high level of informal personal connections with 
government bureaucracies. As the actual nature of informal relations has not changed 
much since the Soviet times despite numerous reforms of government structures and 
institutions, the efficiency of post-Soviet economic and institutional reforms can be put 
under question even in Russia which, undoubtedly moved further towards capitalism than 
any other post-Soviet economy. 
The model of state-business relations that has developed in Belarus in the last two 
decades assumes the leading role of the state as the main economic actor. Since the 
government managed to keep tight grip on the country’s industrial base, Russian-style 
powerful oligarchic lobby has never developed. The dominance of certain ethnic clans in 
the economy and politics was also impossible in Belarus due to a relatively homogenous 
ethnic composition of the population. Hence, the literature on Belarusian transition 
describes the ‘pseudo-market’ transition model where the government has made 
continuous attempts to preserve Soviet institutional structures and socialist-style state-
business relations (e.g., Brixiova and Volchok, 2005; Fritz, 2008; Wilson, 2012, Favaro, 
Smits and Bakanova, 2012; Cuaresma, Oberhofer and Vincelette, 2012; Danilovich and 
Croucher, 2015; Dabrowski, 2016). The result is the unsustainable model where the state 
possesses overwhelming control over the economy, and the changes only occur on surface 
in order for the country to obtain a certain positive image in international ratings, such as 
the World Bank’s Doing Business report.  
Indeed, although for the first few years of independence Belarussian economy and 
society were undergoing the transition ‘from plan to market’ similar to the rest of the 
former Soviet Union, since mid-1990s the reforms were stalled and then reversed. Unlike 
Russia, where such ‘involuntary retroregression’ (Burawoy, 2001) had led to the 
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establishment of powerful state-capturing oligarchic structures, in Belarus the 
consolidation of power occurred around formal institutional structures, particularly their 
executive (Presidential) branch which managed to preserve control over the economy and 
subordinate newly-created economic elites which were forced to establish strong ties to 
the governmental and presidential structures in order to continue their economic activities 
(e.g., Wilson, 2012). Belarusian government thus acts as a capitalist corporatist interest 
group and occupies the same niche oligarchs and ethnic clans have in the rest of the 
region.  
At the same time, private property rights in Belarus are weakly protected; there is 
no independent judiciary; the regulation is rather unpredictable since the country is run 
by presidential decrees which supersede the law. The industry is still represented by fully 
state-owned or quasi-privatised enterprises with an excessively large government share 
(more than 90 percent in some cases). Since the majority of the population outside the 
capital, Minsk, is employed at these companies, the government retains indirect control 
over wages thus creating an artificial sense of equality among the large share of the 
population thus avoiding large-scale social unrest (Bell and Bell, 2015). However, a few 
latest legal acts, particularly the controversial ‘law on social parasites’, which in effect, 
taxes the most vulnerable groups of population have caused mass protests which were 
suppressed by the police.  
The private sector accounts for about a quarter of all businesses and 
predominantly consists of small and medium-size service companies with the total output 
of 20.6 percent of GDP in 2015 (Shimanovich, 2016). The largest share of the output 
from private companies comes from IT sector which has received a considerable boost in 
the last few years, with its output reaching $US1120 million in 2015 (Uniter, 2016). 
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Despite being united in a few employers’ and entrepreneurs’ associations, private 
Belarusian companies have so far failed to to create an industrial lobby strong enough to 
influence government policymaking.  
The largest share of domestic investments in Belarus is initiated by the 
government and is undertaken either by state-owned/quasi-privatised enterprises or is 
delivered through government investment programmes, e.g., the industry modernisation 
programme aimed at replacing outdated machinery and equipment at the country’s 
manufacturing enterprises (e.g., Sokolova, 2009; Ministry of Economics of the Republic 
of Belarus, 2012). Despite the fact that the actual rate of investment in Belarus was higher 
than in the rest of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) until the last two years, 
the centralised control over the size and the distribution of investment funds negatively 
affected their effectiveness. State-owned and quasi-privatised enterprises still follow the 
Soviet-type centrally planned system of output-based targets developed by branch 
ministries in order to meet growth standards set by the President’s administration (e.g., 
Bell and Bell, 2015; Dabrowski, 2016; Dobrinsky et al., 2016). The targets are set 
incredibly high and are impossible to reach given the current state of the industry, One 
example is the government requirement to enterprises to cut production costs by 25 
percent by the end of 2016 (Zlotnikov, 2017) and simultaneously increase the output to 
achieve planned GDP growth rates. 
 Previous studies found that enterprise directors had a little say in the way the 
investment funds were used and had to comply with the state policies under the threat of 
criminal prosecution (Dabrowski, 2016). The latest criminal cases against the business 
proved the same to be true for private investors, some of whom were accused of 
mismanaging funds and not reaching impossibly high production targets. For example, 
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the private investor who bought the bicycle and motorcycle factory ‘Motovelo’ and was 
accused of such crimes, was given an 11-year prison sentence. All his property, including 
the company shares, was confiscated by the state (Sputnik, 2017).  
When analysing the Belarusian ‘pseudo-market’ transition model, one may 
wonder whether there is any scope for independent company-level decision-making. Our 
questions therefore are: to what degree (if any) can senior management of Belarusian 
state-owned, quasi-privatised and private companies act autonomously with respect to 
company investment; and what methods (if any) they use to push their companies’ 
agenda? 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Problems with conducting primary research in Belarus have been highlighted by 
earlier studies (e.g., Mandell, 2004; Danilovich and Croucher, 2015; Danilovich, 
Croucher and Makovskaya). The most common issues include the lack of reliable data on 
enterprise policies due to lack of documentation since Belarusian enterprises routinely 
only collect data they need for state reporting; and scarce secondary data on state-
enterprise relations and on company decision-making in general. 
For our inquiry the main problem presented the unwillingness of senior 
management to participate in the research and grant researchers access to company data 
and personnel. The system of ideological control at Belarusian enterprises is even 
stronger than it was in the Soviet times. Hence senior managers fear of being the ones 
disclosing potentially sensitive information contradicting the official position. CEOs of 
private companies, to our surprise, were much more accommodating which presented a 
dramatic change from previous years when they were as hostile to researchers as their 
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counterparts from state-owned and quasi-privatised enterprises. However, we were able 
to obtain information from some of the representatives of the senior management of state-
owned and quasi-privatised enterprises. 
Sample 
Our sample included senior managers of 9 state-owned and quasi-privatised 
manufacturing enterprises (4 deputy directors, 3 chief financial officers and 6 planning 
managers) as well as the CEOs of 8 private companies, representing service, retail and IT 
sectors. Though some may argue that the different statuses of the senior managers from 
both categories of the state-controlled enterprises may have impacted the reliability of the 
received information, in reality the senior management of Belarusian enterprises is rather 
well-knowledgeable of the actual state of the relations between their directors and their 
superiors in branch ministries and other governmental institutions. None of the company 
directors themselves participated in the study which can be explained by their 
unwillingness to open themselves up to anything that could potentially compromise 
informal relationships they’ve created with governmental organisations. Unlike them, the 
CEOs of private companies were much more open to the conversation. We believe that 
the reason for their openness was that none of their companies was among what 
Belarusian authorities would deem ‘strategically important’ and hence requiring direct 
ideological control.  
Measurements 
Finding measurements which reflect both formal and informal state-business relations 
in Belarus has been a challenging exercise. On the one hand, formal relations are 
supposed to be largely captured by the World Bank Doing Business indicators which 
cover a number of areas, from starting a business, registering property and getting credit 
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to contract enforcement and insolvencies, and the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index. However, in our view, these indicators do not cover the important 
indicators of informal relations between enterprise directors and government officials. 
Hence, in addition to using these two sets of indices, we add a number of others, i.e.: 
● Negotiated changes in output targets; 
● Areas of independent investment-related decision making; 
● Amount of state investment funding received; 
● Amount and dynamics of government subsidies received (these funds are different 
from investment funding since they are aimed not at the improvement of the 
production process but on debt repayment and elimination of wage arrears); 
● The dynamics of annual number of inspections by various government bodies; 
● Amount of ‘social welfare burden’ on the company’s books. 
The direct government influence on companies was also assessed through the analysis of 
the strength of the ideological control at individual companies.  
 
Methods 
Semi-structured interviews were used as the main method for the study and were 
supplemented by the analysis of available company statistics. The choice of interviews as 
the main research method was dictated by the unwillingness of the respondents to fill in 
questionnaires (the common practice we noticed during our previous encounters with 
Belarusian enterprise managers). Hence the interviews allowed collecting rich first-hand 
data which otherwise would not have been available. Despite the belief that using 
interviews as a research tool when studying non-market economies is non-objective since 
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the responses can be biased, in our case they allowed to obtain the data on a sensitive 
subject from the companies with different forms of ownership.  
Each interview took between 45 to 60 minutes. Interviews were conducted at the 
workplaces; the ones with the senior managers of state-owned and quasi-privatised 
companies had to be recorded manually since the subjects refused to have any recordings 
of their voices made which shows the degree of their fear to be compromised in any way. 
The CEOs of private companies were more open to recording the interviews, although 
some preferred to have the interviews conducted outside of their workplaces. The data 
received were manually analysed in relation to questions asked. 
The statistical analysis involved analysing the figures on company output as well 
as statistics on enterprise expenditure. The statistical data from state-owned and quasi-
privatised enterprises proved to be valuable in two ways: first as a quality control tool for 
some of the interview data, and, second, as a separate source allowing to, at least partially, 
trace the dynamics of the relations between the state and each individual company. 
Similar data from private companies was far patchier and much less useful in this respect.  
 
FINDINGS 
State-business relations in Belarus: do international indexes cover them all? 
The relationship between the state and the business is reflected by the number of 
composite ratings created by international organisations. The main question is whether 
(despite claiming objectivity) they actually present the full picture of the said relations? 
We analysed two of the most influential, the World Bank’s Doing Business (DB) rating 
and the Transparency International’ Corruption Perception Index (CPI) with respect to 
Belarusian economy and institutional environment for business.  
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Belarus was showing positive dynamics in both ratings over the years, 
demonstrating the easing in overcoming formal barriers to registering and starting the 
business, getting credit (also as a result of better access to information on public finance), 
dealing with contract enforcement, insolvencies, being more protected from bribery and 
extortion due to improved judiciary and law enforcement (Table 1). Although better 
ratings can be an indicator of improved institutional environment, one still wonders 
whether these changes have found their reflection in the actual relationships between the 
state and the enterprises of various forms of ownership.  
 
Table 1  
The dynamics of Doing Business and Corruption Perception Index ratings for Belarus 
Year Doing Business rating (out of 183 
countries) 
Corruption perception Index rating 
(out of 176 countries) 
2006 124 151 
2007 129 150 
2008 110 151 
2009 85 139 
2010 58 127 
2011 68 143 
2012 60 123 
2013 58 123 
2014 63 119 
2015 57 107 
2016 50 79 
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2017 37 n/a 
Source: Doing Business; Corruption Perception Index, various years 
Unfortunately, none of the indexes provide separate estimations for enterprises of 
different forms of ownership. The analysis of the methodology used for calculating the 
indexes shows that they were based on the influence institutional environment has on 
purely private companies, which, in case of Belarus, do not exceed a quarter of the total 
number of companies, are mostly SMEs and are not being covered by the system of 
production targets and government programs thus reducing their contacts with 
government officials to the minimum.  
Another problem with the indexes when applied to Belarusian reality is that the 
indicators included in the composite indexes reflect changes in the law, not in real-life 
practices. To name a few, a ‘getting credit’ indicator (a part of the Doing Business rating), 
for example, reflects legal changes to the rights of borrowers and lenders, the ease of 
obtaining information on available credit, existence of the centralised credit database, as 
well as a the introduction of some new formal elements into the system, such as the launch 
of the unitary secured transactions system or securing the right of the creditors to receive 
back the funds through the court in case the borrower goes into administration. Although 
these elements are easily introducible (and have been introduced in Belarus for the rating 
purposes), they do not reflect the actual availability of credit to Belarusian companies 
since a) most of the commercial banks in the country are de facto state-owned (e.g., Bell 
and Bell, 2015) and operate under the same government rules which limit the availability 
of credit to pure private companies, and b) the majority of the country’s industrial core is 
also directly or indirectly owned by the government and is financed outside of the 
traditional banking credit system either through state investment programs or direct 
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subsidies from the ministries, both of which are not included in the ‘getting credit’ 
indicator.  
Another example of limited coverage of the Doing Business rating is the 
‘protecting minority investors’ indicator. Under the conditions of market economy, the 
protection of the interests of minority shareholders from company directors’ arbitrary 
decisions represents an important achievement. The data is collected from corporate and 
securities accounts and shows respective changes in company codes and the relevant 
legislature (both laws and court rulings). However, these formal sources do not manifest 
the actual state of the problem in the state-controlled Belarusian economy. The only 
minority shareholders at quasi-privatised and private companies in the country are the 
workers (the labour collective). While quasi-privatised enterprises are controlled by the 
government and the workers are deprived of their voice (Danilovich, 2017), no conflict 
of interests with respect to the management’s decisions can occur. Private companies of 
any potential value to the state are often renationalised under any excuse. One of the most 
vivid cases was the renationalisation of the pharmaceutical company ‘Belmedpreparaty’. 
The enterprise was first privatised by the workers and the management in 1995. It was 
returned into state ownership by the court ruling in 2004 when the company was about to 
attract potential foreign investors, something the government was not going to allow.  
A similar story happened with the wood processing/furniture producer 
‘Pinskdrev’ which was fully privatised in the 1990s. However, in 2011 it was 
renationalised by a special Presidential Decree which appointed the state kontsern 
‘Bellesbumprom’ as ‘Pinskdrev’s management company under the pretext of the need to 
protect the interests of the labour collective after the accident took place at the enterprise.  
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Another blow to early Belarusian privatisation was the Presidential Decree 
No.107 (14.03.2011) which limited free circulation of company shares at the securities 
market and established state observing committees at private companies with the 
government share of 50 percent and less. The observing committees were granted the 
right to start the renationalisation process at their companies if they were concerned that 
the rights of minority shareholders were threatened. The most well-known recent case 
induced by the Decree No.107 was the renationalisation of the confectionary companies 
‘Spartak’ and ‘Kommunarka’, whose shares were ceased from the American investor who 
bought them in the 1990s. The court found violations in the initial privatisation procedure 
and ruled in favour of the state regardless of the fact that a10-year limitation period on 
those shares had expired long before then (Manenok, 2016). The need to protect the 
interests of minority shareholders was again the formal reason given by the state.  
Similar to Doing Business reports, the Corruption Perception Index (see e.g., 
Transparency International, 2016) largely relies on a number of formal measurements. 
The use of the survey of the businesses as the main data collection method makes it more 
reliable than Doing Business. At the same time, when applied to the authoritarian country 
like Belarus, not to the traditional market democracies, CPI suffers from the same 
problems as DB. Its survey takes into account the perceptions of private companies, 
leaving state-owned and quasi-privatised enterprises outside of the analysis, thus 
adversely affecting the validity and generalisability of the final scores. Besides, personal 
perceptions of selected analysts, experts and businessmen on corruption may differ quite 
considerably from a day-to day business practice. Also, CPI does not account for the 
multiplicity of the forms of corruption. For example, private companies in Belarus do not 
need to bribe government officials on a daily basis but may have to provide non-monetary 
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favours or services (e.g., sponsor certain events) in order to reduce the amount of red tape. 
Another weakness of the Corruption Perception Index is that it does not account for 
extensive informal connections businesses in the countries with suppressing institutional 
environment must develop in order to survive. It also does not account for the amount of 
corruption-induced nepotism (e.g., hiring or promoting workers with certain 
governmental connections) which has been very common in Belarus (Danilovich and 
Croucher, 2015).  
Thus one can argue that despite being useful sources of information on certain 
aspects of the business climate and institutional environment in Belarus, the indexes 
developed by international organisations fail to fully capture the reality of the 
relationships between the business and its institutional environment in this particular 
‘pseudo-market’ economy.  
 
State-business relations in Belarus: the findings from the empirical study 
The empirical study aimed to fill the gaps in our understanding of the relationships 
between the state and companies in Belarus left by the indexes developed by international 
organisations. The analysis of the interview and statistical data resulted in a number of 
important findings.  
We found clear differences between the management’s level of autonomy at state-
controlled (state-owned and quasi-privatised) and private companies in a number of areas 
(Table 2). 
Table 2 
Level of independence in company decision-making  in Belarus, type of ownership 
Type of Areas of decision-making 
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ownership Attracting 
outside 
investment
s 
Retaining 
profit 
Reinvesting 
profit 
Changes in 
the level of 
output 
Managing 
internal 
labour 
markets 
State-
owned 
 permission 
from the 
kontsern 
needed, 
involves a 
large 
degree of 
informality 
only profits 
in 
Belarusian 
rubles may 
be retained, 
currency is 
to be sold to 
the 
government  
 permission 
from the 
kontsern 
needed for 
every new 
project, has 
to be 
negotiated 
are set 
centrally, 
have to be 
negotiated  
according to 
the Labour 
Code and 
Presidential 
decrees 
Quasi-
privatised 
permission 
from the 
kontsern 
needed, 
involves a 
large 
degree of 
informality 
only profits 
in 
Belarusian 
rubles may 
be retained, 
currency is 
to be sold to 
the 
government 
permission 
from the 
kontsern 
needed for 
every new 
project, has 
to be 
negotiated 
are set 
centrally, 
have to be 
negotiated 
according to 
the Labour 
Code and 
Presidential 
decrees 
Fully 
private 
no 
governmen
t control 
only profits 
in 
Belarusian 
rubles may 
be retained, 
currency is 
to be sold to 
the 
government, 
if not a 
resident of a 
free 
economic 
zone 
no 
government 
control but is 
subject to 
inspections 
by state 
controlling 
bodies “for 
crime 
prevention 
reasons” 
no 
government 
control 
according to 
the Labour 
Code and 
Presidential 
decrees 
Source: interview data, company archives 
 Although, by law, every domestic company has absolute freedom over the 
distribution of funds and making investment deals, in reality the need to obtain 
permissions and constantly negotiate with their branch ministry or managing kontsern 
makes enterprise management a weaker party in state-business relations. Deputy directors 
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interviewed for the study assent that obtaining the ministry’s consent on attracting 
external investors or reinvesting profits into new projects, for example, depends on 
‘certain special relations’ the enterprise holds with its institutional superiors. These 
relations, they admit, are largely based on the enterprise being ‘in the ministry’s good 
books’ by continuously achieving set output targets and not asking for subsidies.  
Good personal relationships between the enterprise director and ‘the people 
above’ also play an important role. As one of them put it: ‘If they see that enterprise is 
doing fine, no labour conflicts, deficits or anything of the kind, then they know that the 
director can be trusted. Yes, it takes a lot of persuasion every time because no one wants 
to be blamed if thing don’t exactly work out as promised’. When asked whether such 
negotiations have any elements of informality, the senior managers usually resort to 
Aesop language, using phrases like ‘well, you should understand, things are never just 
done…’, ‘good people eventually always understand each other’, ‘good human relations 
between people is the key to success’, and so on. They never openly admitted to offering 
bribes to government officials or being asked for any. Instead, deputy directors usually 
referred to ‘negotiations’. At the same time, some interviewees mentioned that there 
exists a certain degree of mutual dependency between their companies and branch 
ministries/kontsers since the latter are ultimately responsible for ensuring that the 
government-set targets for their industries are met. The responses therefore implicitly 
confirm that in certain areas enterprise management of successful companies has a lot of 
leverage with their superiors in government institutions which strengthen its bargaining 
position.  
However, things change dramatically if the enterprise is bidding for funds from 
one of the government investment programmes. In the words of the planning manager of 
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the wood processing plant, ‘these are a curse rather than a blessing because the control 
over the money is so strict that you never know when and in what you find yourself 
guilty’. Her peer from the machine-building plant said in his ‘kitchen interview’: ‘the 
state money always comes with the plan signed you know where [he pointed at the 
ceiling], so we can’t really go sideways. Even when it was obvious for us that the return 
won’t be what they thought in the Ministry it would be, we could not really do anything 
but go with the flow. The director and our department tried to negotiate with them so that 
the money would be better used for other purposes, but it was like bumping into the wall: 
you got money for modernisation, so go on and modernise. Modernise how, and what to 
do with all these people [excess personnel after modernisation], there was no instruction. 
Just, the President gave you the money, which means he trusts you, don’t betray his trust! 
And this is the worst thing of all: fine, you get those lathes; stick them onto the shopfloor 
and then what?! Same people, same targets, same materials, no orders, so how do we 
show all this profit they expect to see? Now we have a new director and the deputy 
directors were all removed from office, luckily not to prison, and we are still no better 
off, so who knows how long these new ones are going to remain’.  
When asked whether there was a way to go around the rules, the common answer 
was ‘of course there are and quite a few, but not with the state investment, it is too much 
risk’. Thus, to use Zartman and Rubin (2000), when Belarusian government uses its 
superior position as the sole institutional investor, it exhibits typical exploitative 
behaviour towards the enterprise receiving the funds depriving the latter of any 
opportunity to negotiate the conditions and use of the funds provided.   
Private companies which are not subordinated to ministries or kontserns report 
very little use of informal connections and need for negotiation in these areas. They are 
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usually free to choose and attract investors or reinvest their profits, provided that they 
prove to the controlling government bodies that the funds are not used in illegal deals or 
to fund anything outside their primary economic activity (i.e., funding political opposition 
or sponsoring independent civil society organisations). Private companies have very little 
access to state investment programs unless the governments sees them as strategically 
valuable, in which case state investments may be forced upon private companies as the 
means of gaining control over them. The CEOs of private IT companies admitted that 
they use their informal connections most on rare occasions when they bid for state 
contracts. This relative independence from the state gives successful private companies a 
stronger bargaining position in negotiations with government institutions thus largely 
shielding them from petty corruption.  
Both state-controlled and private companies have received much more freedom 
in the area of intra-firm investments in the recent years, compared to the previous research 
(see Danilovich and Croucher, 2011; 2015; Danilovich, Croucher and Makovskaya, 
2016). The most significant changes have taken place in the area of investment in 
personnel. Presidential Decree No.5 ‘On the intensification of the requirements to senior 
managers and workers in organisations’ (15.12.2014) considerably widened the rights of 
the employer with regards to the workforce. The employer received the right to fire at 
will under the newly introduced ‘discriminating circumstances’ definition2, as well as the 
right to change the working conditions (including pay) in individual contracts with a 7-
day notice given to the workers. In case the worker refuses to accept the new working and 
pay conditions, the employer has the right to dismiss them without pay. These 
                                                          
2 ‘Discriminating circumstances’ refer to any circumstances which an employer deems damaging, or 
potentially damaging, to the company and its reputation. In Belarussian context, this definition is usually 
used to describe any manifestations of job dissatisfaction by workers or unauthorised trade union activity.  
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‘innovations’ resulted in a considerable reduction of enterprise expenditure on the 
workforce, particularly of investments in training and retraining. Training budgets for the 
personnel in highly-skilled technical and managerial positions (previously main 
recipients of work-related training) were slashed, and training of blue-collar workers is 
now limited to in-house health and safety training. As the labour planning manager of one 
of the machine-building plants put it: ‘of course, we understand everything, and we feel 
for workers. At the end of the day, we are all workers and all in the same situation. But 
these are hard times, the enterprise cannot afford to give that much to people and people 
should understand that. And they do: if earlier we had many people coming requesting 
and even insisting [on training], now we don’t. And they usually don’t scream about this, 
because no one wants to become a parasite [in this, she referred to another ‘innovation’ – 
the Presidential Decree No.3 (2.04.2015) widely known as ‘the law on social parasites’ 
which requires the unemployed to pay $US245/year to finance the state welfare]’.  
Company statistics confirms continued practice of rehiring existing employees on 
new contracts to avoid paying for training or hiring ‘from the street’ on short-term fixed 
contracts, the trend noticed in our earlier research (Danilovich and Croucher, 2015). The 
data shows that the overall investment in training has fallen below 0.1 percent of the total 
expenditure on personnel at 8 out of 9 state-controlled companies in the sample.  
Private companies have always enjoyed more freedom in dealing with their 
personnel and their investments in training were traditionally lower than at state-
controlled enterprises. Since the introduction of new legislation, the statistical data on 
retail and service private companies in the sample shows that they have stopped 
investments in training and retraining altogether. IT companies still have some funds 
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allocated for these investments but rarely use them as the management encourages 
employees to self-study.  
With regards to their day-to-day economic activities, neither state-controlled, nor 
private companies admit the need to regularly use their informal connections thus giving 
certain credibility to the conclusions of the Corruption Perception Index and the Doing 
Business ratings. Informal connections and negotiating favours are used in daily activities 
only in dealing with certain inspecting bodies such as the fire inspection and the sanitary 
control committee. The companies that are affected the most are private retail and service 
companies due to nature of their business. The CEO of one of the private retail companies 
even admitted having a small ‘investment budget for greasing things up’. State-controlled 
enterprises that have special labour protection engineers on their payroll are much less 
affected. At the same time, the CEOs of two IT companies interviewed for the study did 
not see much of informality in their daily operations. Their use of informal connections 
is low and is limited to the periodic visits from fire and sanitary inspection and the 
relations with individual tax inspectors when submitting quarterly and yearly figures.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
It has been previously argued that the fluidity of formal institutions which followed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union led to state capture by informal oligarchic structures across 
the post-Soviet space. Our analysis only partially confirms this thesis. Indeed, the first 
decade of post-Soviet transition was characterised by the destruction of Soviet 
institutional system and the emergence of business and ethnic interest groups which 
managed to largely capture/colonise formal government institutions. However, 
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subsequent changes in a number of the economies in the region limited the influence of 
informal business lobbying networks.  
The analysis of the literature reveals that although the majority of the economies 
are characterised by varying degrees of institutional fluidity, the reality of state-business 
relations differs quite considerably across the region. However, changes to the transition 
path witnessed in the last two decades, notably declining number of liberal reforms, 
recentralisation of economic and political apparatus,  indicate that the majority of former 
Soviet economies have been gradually moving away from establishing capitalist 
economic models towards much less liberalised regulatory regimes.  As bad and 
disfunctional as they may sound, these newly found regulatory modes frequently provide  
certain development opportunities for business within the new, stricter rules of the game.   
Unlike in other post-Soviet states, business structures in Belarus never managed 
to reach the level of power that would’ve allowed them to directly influence government 
economic policy. The preservation of Soviet type state-business relations is characterised 
the high degree of institutional concentration manifested in a direct government control 
over the majority of the companies either through direct ownership or the controlling 
stake. Thus, in order to maintain a certain degree of autonomy over their investment 
decisions and compensate for their wittingly weaker negotiating position, the 
management of state-controlled companies is forced to establish close informal 
connections with their superiors in governmental structures.  
On the other hand, private companies which are supposed to be totally suppressed 
by the Soviet-style regulatory machine, enjoy more freedom than the state-controlled 
enterprises which have been shielded from competition for a long time by government 
subsidies, grants and investment funding. However, our findings indicate that even these 
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enterprises have a certain degree of autonomy in investment-related decision-making. It 
seems reasonable to suggest that under the conditions of prolonged economic crisis 
Belarusian government does no longer possess enough economic and institutional 
resources to be able to control every aspect of company activities and had to resort to 
directly overseeing only the areas it deems most important.  
The largest increase in enterprise autonomy in the recent years has occurred in 
investments in personnel, particularly expenditure on training and retraining which was 
made unnecessary by the latest changes in labour law.  In a way, this makes intra-firm 
employment relations more capitalist, but can also be seen as the evidence of the failure 
of the state ideology since the state voluntarily shifted off its responsibility to protect the 
labour collective from the despotism of the employer, one of the cornerstones of 
Belarusian ‘social market economy’.  
In other areas, such as access to financial resources, reinvesting profits, attracting 
outside investment and negotiating output targets, personal informal relationships with 
government institutions still play a crucial role for state-controlled companies. Some 
areas, such as the utilisation of the investment funds provided by the government, remain 
outside of the company management’s control and even good informal relationships with 
ministries/kontserns cannot change the situation.  
Thus, our data proves that despite operating under the conditions of the 
authoritarian political regime and acting from the position of a weaker party in 
negotiations with the government structures, both state-controlled and private domestic 
Belarusian companies demonstrate a certain degree of bargaining power over their 
government counterparts thus indirectly influencing state policies and managing to 
maintain a certain degree of autonomy in their investment decisions.  
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The Soviet legacy in state-business relations does not spread onto the relations 
between the government and private companies. Unlike state-controlled enterprises, 
private businesses in Belarus are not directly subordinated to any branch ministry or 
kontsern and thus operate largely outside of direct state control. Their relations with 
formal institutions are limited and resemble those in Latin America or Africa where 
private companies are more vulnerable to petty corruption from individual government 
agencies, not a direct government control.  
Increasing differences in state-business relations for private and state-controlled 
companies have led to the situation where Belarusian economy is de facto two disparate 
economies: an excessively controlled economy of state-owned and quasi-privatised 
enterprises, predominantly manufacturing characterised by centrally set targets, where the 
enterprise directors are often pushed to resort to their extensive informal connections in 
order to obtain certain economic benefits; and the much less controlled economy of 
private companies, operating predominantly in high-tech and service sectors, where the 
government control is limited to overseeing the reporting and tax payments, company 
management is free in its day-to-day operations of any kind, and the informality is less 
and is at a much more individual level.  
We can therefore conclude that although the ability of the majority of individual 
economic actors to act independently is being suppressed within the Belarusian ‘pseudo-
market’ system, and the Soviet institutional legacy still largely determines state-business 
relations in the industry; state-controlled companies still manage to exert indirect 
influence on the government by having established informal connections with the formal 
institutions that oversee them and use high institutional concentration as the means to 
influence their superiors.Thus, despite obvious excessive legal regulatory burden the 
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Belarusian government manages to secure a certain level of tax payment from businesses 
by allowing them a certain degree of freedom to economic actors and thus keeping itself 
away from total collapse despite a prolonged economic crisis. The main question 
therefore is for how long limited decision-making autonomy will give companies enough 
incentive to keep operating?  
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